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NOTE
With reference to the interim Rules promuLgated on 22 June 1982 by the
Department of cormerce und,er the Export Administration Act of lg7g,
and to the communityrs note presented on 14 July 1982, the European
Community wishes to present further Comments on the new Export
Administration Rules, with the request that this note and these
cornments be Eransmitted to the-Department of Commerce in accordance
with that DeparEment's invitation for public comments to be made by 2l
August 1982.
The European Community wishe.s to draw attention to the importance that
it attaches to the legal, political and economic aspects of the United
Statest measures, including their impact on the commercial poLicy of
the Community. As to the 1ega1 aspects, the European Community
considers the U.S, measures contrary to international 1aw, and
apparentty at variance with rules and principles laid down in U.S.
law.
As to the political and economic aspects, it is clear that the U.S.
measures are liable to affect a wide variety of business activities,
while their primary purpose is to delay the construction of the
pipel-ine to bring SovieE gas to l^lestern Europe. The European
Community holds that it is unlikely that the U.S. measures will in
fact delay materially the construction of the pipeline or the delivery
of the gas.
The pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe can be completed using
Soviet technology and production capacity diverted from other Parts of
their current programme. Furthermore the recent U.S. measures provide
the Soviets with a strong inducement to enlarge their or^m manufacEuring
capacigy and to accelerate their or^m turbine and compressor developments'
thus becoming independent of Western sources. Gas could sti1l flow to
Ehe Community starting as scheduled in 1984 owing to the existence of
subsEantial spare capacity in the existing pipeline sysrem' sufficient
to cover the requiremenEs of the early phase\of the programme of
deliveries.
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4 One of the main elements of the community's policy of reducing the
vulnerability of its energy supply is based on diversification of
sources. Gas from the Soviet union will help to conserve the
communityts own stock of gas, oil" and oiher fuels, and will rerluce the
cormunityts reliance on other foreign sources. use of siberian gas
will not create a dangerous dependence on that source. Even when gas
is flowing at the maximum rate, in 1990, it will represent less than
4 per cent of the Community's total energy consumpEion.
whatever the effects on the soviet union, the effeets on European
community interests of the u.s" measures, applied retroacti-u,:iy
and without sufficient consultation, are unquestionably and seriously
damaging. Many companies interested as sub-cor-rtractcrs, or
suppliers of components, have made inl'estments and committe,l productive
eapacities to the pipeline project, well before the American measures
were taken. Though they rnay use no American technology, they will
suffer complete loss of business if the European contribution to the
project is blocked. some of these companies may not survive. Major
European companies that can survive the immediate ross of business,
will nevertheLess suffer from lower 1evels of capacity utilization
and loss of producEion and profits. while workers will be laid off
temporarily or permanently.
rn the tonger term, European cornrnunity companies may be clamaged by
the disruption of their contracts concluded in good faith, becauca rhey
may cease to be reliable suppliers in the eyes not only of Ehe soviet
union, but also of their actual and potential business partners in
other countries. One inevitable consequencewouldbe to call in
question the usefulness of technological links between European and
American firms, if contracEs could be nullified at any time by decision
of Ehe U.S. Administration. Another consequence to be feared is that.
the claim of u.s. jurisdiction aecompanying u.s. investmenr wilt
create a resistance abroad to the flow of u.s. invesEment. Thus,
these export conLrol measures run counter to the policy aims of the
united states of easing the transfer of technology and of encouraging
free trade in general. There will be other far-reaching effects
upon business confidence. These measures thus add to the climate of
uncertainty that is already pervading the world economy as a who1e.
The European Community r:herefore calls upon che United States Authorities
to withdraw these measures.,
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COI,IMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE AMENDMENTS
OF 22 JUNE I982 TO THE US EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
0n June 22, 1982, the Department of Commerce at the direction of
presidenE Reagan and pursuant to Section 6 of the Export AdministraEion
Acg amended Secrio11s 376.12,379.8 and 385.2 of. the Export Administration
Regulations. These amendment,s amounted to an expansion of the
existing US controts on the export and re-export of goods and
technical data relating to oi1 and gas exploration, exploitation,
transmission and ref inement.
The European Cornmunity believes that the US regulations as amended
contain sweeping extensions of US jurisdiction which are unlawful
under internat,ional 1aw. Moreover, the new Regulations and the way in
which they affect contracts in course of performance seems to run
counter to criteria of the Export Administration Act and also to
certain principles of U.S. public 1aw'
The main thrust of the Regulations Itray be summarized as follows:
First of all' Persons within a third country may not re-exPort
machinery for the exploraCion, production, transmission or refinement
of oiL and natural gas' or componenEs thereof, if it is of U'S'
origin, without permission of the U.S' Govern$ent'
Moreover, atry person subject to the jurisdiction of the united
states (l) is required to get prior written authorization by the
0fficeofExportAdministrationforexportorre-exporttothe
u.s.s.R. of non-us goods and technical data related to oil and gas
exploration, production, Eransmission and refinement'
2
(l) Now defined as (i
resident, of the U
United States; (i
United States; or
other organizatio
ovrned or conEroll(iii).
:
I
T
I)
II
:'
) Any person wherever locaEed who is a citizen or
rria"a bt"t".' (ii) any person actuatly within the
ii) any corporation organized under Ehe laws of the(iv) any partnership, association, corPoration or
n, wherever organized- or doing business' Ehat is
ed by persons specified in paiagraphs (i) ' (ii) or
2Finally, no person in the U.S. or i-n a foreign counEry may export or
re-export to the U.S.S.R. foreign products directly derived from U.S.
technical data (l) relating to machinery etc. utilized for the
exploration, production or transmission or refinement of petroleum or
natural gas or cornmodities produced in plants based on such U.S.
Eechnical data.
This prohibition applies in three alternative situations, namely:
if a written assurance $ras required under the U.S. export
regulations when the data were exported;
if any person subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.A. (as
defined in note (2) receives royalties or other compensation for,
or has licensed, the use of the technical data concerned,
regardless of when the data were exPorted from Ehe U.S.;
if the recipient of Ehe U.S. technical data has agreed (in the
licensing agreement or other conEracts) to abide by U.S. export
controt regulations.
3. The following conrnents will discuss firstl the international legal
aspects of the US measures, including (a) the generally recognized
bases on which jurisdiction can be founded in international law and
(b) other bases of jurisdiction which might be invoked by the U.S.
Government; secondly the rules and principles as laid down in U.S'
law, in particular the Export Administration Act, and as applied by
U.S. Courts, which would seem to be at variance with the Amendments of
June 22, 1982,
This expression is very broadly defined in 15 cFR para.379.l.
Now defined as (i) Any person ruherever located who is a ciEizen or
residenE of the United States; (ii) any person actualty wirhin the
United States; (iii) any corPoration organized under che laws of the
United States or of any SLate, Territory, Possession or District of
the United States; or iir) any partnership, association, corporation
o. oit"r orgallzation, wher"',r.t- organized or doing business' 
-!f3a i"
or,sned o, 
"orrErolled by 
persons specif ied in paragraphs (i) 
' 
(ii) or
(iii).
A
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II. THE AMENDMENT S UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Genera1ly isdiction in international Law
The U.S. measures as they apply in the Present case are unacceptable
under international 1aw because of their extre-territorial asPects.
They seek to regulate comPanies not of U.S. nationality in respect of
Eheir conduct outside the United States and particularly the handling
of properEy and technical data of these companies not within the
United States.
They seek to impose on non-US companies the restriction of U'S: law by
threatening them with discriminatory sanctions in the field of trade
which are inconsistent with the normal comnercial practice established
between the U.S. and the E.C'
L
In Ehis way the Arnendments of June 22, 1982, run counEer
generaLly accepted bases of jurisdiction in international
territoriality and the nationality principles (l)'
to the two
iaw; the
5. The territor iality pr inciple (i.e. the notion that a state should
rest,rict its rule-making in principle to Persons and goods within its
territory and Ehat an organization like the European Comunity should
resLrict the applicability of its rules to the territory to which the
Treaty setting it up applies) is a fundamental notion of internationaL
1aw, in particular insofar as it concerns the regulation of the social
and economic activity in a state. The principLe thaE each state - and
mutatis mutandis the comnunity insofar as Powers have been transferred
to it - has the right freely to organize arrd develop it,s social- and
economic system has been confirmed many Eimes in international fora'
The American measures clearly infringe the principle of territoriality'
since they purporE to regulate the activities of companies in the
8.C., noE under the territorial comPetence of the U'S'
6. The nationalit lnc1 le (i.e. the PrescriPtion of ru les for"for Ehenationals, wherever they are) cannot serve as a basis
exEension of u.s. jurisdiction resulting from the AnendmenEs, i'e'
(i) over companies incorporated in E.c. Member states on Ehe basis of
some corporate link (parent-subsidiary) or personal link (e'g'
shareholding) to the U.S.; (ii) over companies incorporated in E'C'
Member sEaEes, either because they have a tie to a u.s'-incorporated
See ResEatement (2nd) of Ehe Foreign Relations Law
f-"=
(l)
paras. l7 and 30 resPectivelY'
of the U.S. (1972),
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cornoar.y, subsidiary or other "U.S. controlled" company through a,
licencing agreement, royalty payments, or payment of oEher compensation,
or because Ehey have bought certain goods originating in the U.S.
ad (i) the Amendments in Ewo places purport to subject Eo U.S.
jurisdiction companies, wherever organized or doing business, which
are subsidiaries of U.S. companies or under the conErot of U.S.
citizens, U.S. residents or even persons actually within Ehe U.S.
This implies that the United States is seeking to impose its corporate
nationality on companies of which the great majority are incorporat,ed
and have their registered office elsewhere, notably in E.C. Member States.
Such action id not in conformity with recognized principles of inter-
national 1aw. In the Barcelona Traction Case, the International Court
of Justice declared that two tradional criteria for determining Ehe
nationality of companies; i.e. the place of incorporation and the
place of the regisEered office of the company concerned, had been
"confirmed by long pracLice and by numerous international instruments".
The Court also scrutinized other tests of corporate nationality, but
concluded that these had not found general acceptance. The Court
consequently placed primary emphasis on the traditional place of
incorporation and Ehe registered office in deciding the case in
point (l). This decision was taken within the framework of the
doctrine of diplomatic protecEion, but reflects a general principle of
international law.
ad (ii) The notion inherent in the subjection to U.S. jurisdiction of
companies with no tie to the U.S. whatsoever, except for a technological
link to a u.s. company, or through possession of u.s. origin goods,
can only be that this technology or such goods should somehow be
considered as unalterably "American" (even though many of the patents
invoLved are registered in the Member StaEes of the European Community).
This seems the only possible explanation for the U.S. RegulaEions
given the facE that national security is not at stake here (see belol'r
under B).
Goods and technology do noE have any nationality and there are no
knowl rules under international law for using goods or technology
situated abroad as a basis of esEablishing jurisdiction over the
persons controlling them. Several Court cases confirm that U.S.
jurisdiction does not follow u.s. origin goods once they have been
discharged in the territory of another country (2).
ICJ Reports 1970, 3,
8
(l)
(2) American President Li
1526 (Hong Kong SuP.
R.l{.360 (Tri.hunal of
aE 43.
nes v. China Mutua1 Trading Co., 1953 A.y.C.
Ct.) and Moens v. Ahlers North German Lloyd'
Commerce Antwerp (1966).
1510,
30
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9 The Amendments of 22 June 1982, therefore, cannot be justified under
the nationality principle, because they ignore the two Eraditional
criteria for determining the nationality of eompanies reconfirmed by
the InternaEional Court of Justice and because they purport to give
some notion of "nationality" to goods and tec'hnologies so as to
establish jurisdiction over persons handling them.
The purported direc! extension of U.S.jurisdiction to non-US incorporated
companies not using U.S. origin technology or componenEs is a fortiori
objectionabLe to the E.C., because neither of these (in themselves
invaLid) justifications could apply.
10. The last mentioned case exemplifies to what extent, the wholesale
infringement of the nationality principle exacerbates the infringement
of the territoriality principle (l). Thus even E.C. incorporated
companies in the example mentioned above according to the Amendments
would have to ask special written permission not of the E.C, but of
the U.S. authorities in order to obtain permission to export goods
produced in the E.C. and based on E.C. technology from the territory
to which the E.C. Treaties apply to the U.S.S.R. The practical impact
of the Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations is thdt
E.C. companies are pressed into service to carry out U.S. trade policy
towards the U.S.S.R., even though these companies are incorporated and
have their registered office within the Cormunity which has its own
trade policy towards the U.S.S.R.
The public policy ("ordre public") of the European Community and of
its Member States is thus purportedly replaced by U.S. public policy
which European companies are forced to carry out within the 8.C., if
they are not to lose export privileges in the U.S. or to face other
sanctions. This is an unacceptabLe interference in the affairS of the
European Community
ll. FurEhermore, it is reprehensible that present U.S. RegulaEions
encourage non-Us companies to submit "voluntarily" to this kind of
mobilization for U.S. PurPoses.
@nofthenationa1ityprincip1ewou1dimp1y.ipsofac!o.
some overlapping with the appLicaEion of the territoriality principle
and this is-acceptable under internaEional Iaw, in some instances, but
I
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rde are not in such a situation in this case.
6Even when submiision to a foreign boycott is entirely voluntary, such
submission within the U.S. has been considered to be undesirable and
contrary to UrS. public policy (l). By the same token it must have
been evident to the U.S. GovernmenE that the statutory encouragement
of voluntary submission to U.S. public policy in Erade matEers t,,iChin
the E.C. is strongly condemned by the European Community. PrivaEe
agreements should not be used in this way as instruments of foreign
poLicy. If a Government in taw and in fact systemaEically encourages
the inclusion of such submission clauses in private contracts the
freedom of conEract is misused in order to circumvent the limits
imposed on national jurisdiction by international law.
IE is self-evident, moreover, that the exisEence of such submission
elauses in certain private contracts cannot serve as e basis for U.S.
r.egulatory jurisdiction which can Properly be exercised sole1y
in conformity with inEernational law. Nor can a company Drevent a
state from objecting to any infringemenE which might oecur of the
jurisdiction of the state to which it belongs.
B. OEher bases o!-igrigl!e!rer
12. There are two other bases of jurisdiction which might be invoked by
the U.S. Government, but which have found less than general accepEance
under international Law. These are:
a) the protective principle (para. 33 of the 2nd Restatement), which
would give a State jurisdiction to proscribe acts done outside
its territory but threatening its security or the operation of
its governmental functions, if such acts are generally recognized
as crimes by states with reasonably developed legal systems;
b),. the so-caLled "effects docErine", under which conduct occurring.",
outside the territory but causing direct, foreseeable and
substantial effects - which are al so constituent elements of a
crime or torg - within Ehe territory may be proscribed (para. I8
of the 2nd Restatement).
(l) Cf. Section 8 of the Export Administration Act and below under
II .A.
-7-
t
1
I
i
I
t
I
13. However, it is clear ab initio that the extension of U,S. jurisdiction
implicit in the Amendments cannot be based on the principles mentioned
under l2(a) or (b).
The "protective principle" has not been invoked by the U.S. Government,
since the Amendments are based on Section 6 (Foreign Policy Controls)
and not on Section 5 (National Security Controls) of the Export
Administration Act. The U.S. Government itself, therefore, has not
sought to base the Amendments on considerations of national security,
The t'effects doctrine" is not applicable. It cannot conceivably be
argued Ehat exports from the European Community to the U.S.S.R. for
the Siberian gas pipeline have within the U.S.A. direct, foreseeable
and subsEantial effects which are not merely undesirable, but which
constitute an elemenE of a crime or tort proscribed by U.S. law. It is
more than likely that they have no direct effects on U.S. trade.
14. For the reasons expounded above, i-t is clear that the U.S. measures of
June 22 , 1982 do noE find a valid basis in any of the generally
recognized - or even the more controversiat - principles of international
law governing state jurisdiction to prescribe rules. As a matter of
fact the measures by their extra-territoriaL character simul'taneously
infringe the territoriality and nationality principles of jurisdiction
and are therefore unlawfut under international law.
III. THE AMENDMENTS UNDER U.S. LAII
A U.S. Reactions to measures similar to the June 22 Amendments
15. If a.foreign country were to take measures like the June 22 Amendments,
it is doubtful whether Ehey would be in conformity with U.S' law and
Ehey would therefore probably not be recognized and enforced by U'S'
courts.
The kind of mobilization of E.C. companies for U.S. purPoses to which
Ehe Community objects was subject to strong American reactions and
legislative counter-measures, when U.S. companies were similarLy
mobilized for the foreign policy PurPoses of other states.
1...'
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The anti-foreigh-boycoEE provisions of Section 8 of the Export
Administration Act are testimony to that. In the same L,ay as the U.S'
could not hccBpt Ehat its companies were turned into instruments of
the foreign policy of other nations, the E.C. cannot accept that its
companies must follow another trade policy than its o'wn within iEs own
territorial jurisdiction.
It is noEeworthy that the anti-boycott provisions of Ehe Export
AdministraEion Act can be invoked in response to a boycott that
takes a less direct form Ehan Ehe June 22 Amendments, namely a boyco,tE
which mereLy tries to dissuade persons from dealing with a third
country by refusing to trade with such persons. An export restriction
patEerned on the June 22 Amendments, in contrast, would directly
prohibit a person from deating with a particular country under Ehe
threat of government-imposed penalties. Therefore, the tatest
Amendments would apPear to be even more far-reaching than a boycott
whieh might give rise to the application of the anti-boycott provisions.
15. Even if for some reason the foreign boycott provisions of the Export
Administratlon Act r^rere noE considered applicable, a foreign country
imposing such restrictions as those imposed by the June 22 Amendments
would probably be viewed by U.S. Courts as attemPting to extend its
laws beyond its territory without sufficient nexus with the U.S.
entity to justify such an extension. This certainly would be the case
with respect to a mere licensee of a foreign concern.
If a foreign goverrunent complained that a U.S. licensee of a foreign
company was not complying v/ith that foreign governmentrs export
restrictions prohibiting such exports, a U.S. federal court would
decline jurisdiction, because U.S. Courts will not enforce foreign
penal statutes (l).
If the observance of a foreign export control by a U.S. subsidiary or
licensee were to become an issue in llrigation between the latter and
its foreign parent company or licensor, a federal or sgate court would
probably not refuse jurisdiction, but would decline to enforce the
export restrictions of the foreign country on the grounds that it
would be contrary to Ehe strong public policy of the forum and not in
the interest of the United States to do so (2).
leDi--Wl-sconsin v. Pelican Instirance Company' 127 US. 265, 290 (1888);
Restatement (2nd) Conflict of Laws para. 89.
(2) Restatement (2nd) Conflict of Laws pp. 90.
I
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This being the reaction of the u.s. regisrator and judiciary to
foreign measures comparable to its or^rn measures of June 22, the u.s.
Government should not have inflicted these measures on the E.c.
companies concerned in the virtual knowledge.that these measures would
be regarded as unlawful and ineffective by public authorities in the
E. C.
gegIlfggg-gI-igf i"diction and Accommgieggl_gf-Iggefeg!
17. rn cases where the conflicting exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.
leads to conflicts of enforcement jurisdiction between states, each
state, according to para. 40 of. the Restatement (2nd) Foreign
Relations Law of the u.S., is required by international law to
consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcementjurisdiction. rn this connecEion the following factors should be
considered:
"a) vital national interests of each of the states;
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcemenE actions would impose upon the person;
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other sEate;
d) the nationality of the other person ...,r.
18. over the past years various u.s. courts of Appeal have pronounced
themselves in favour of this ,balancing of interests" approach.
rn the case of Ehe Timberlane co. v. Bank of America (l) Judge choy
suggested that comity demanded an evaluation and balancing of relevant
factors, and continued: "The element,s to be weighed include the degree
of conflict with foreign law or poLicy, the nationality or alregiance
of the parties, and the locations or principal places of businesses or
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected Eo achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects
on the united st"t"" as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explieit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the united states as compared
with conduct abroad".
B
(l) Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 1977-l Trade Cases No. 61.233.
r0 -
Thus para. (b): "... the president shall consider:
other countries to the imposition or expansion of
by the United States".
:
A similar approach was followed in Mannington Mi1ls (l) and is set ouE
in paragraph 40 of the Second Restatement.
19' Although this "balancing of interest" approach applies in the first
place to courts, there are good reasons why the U.S, GovernmenE should
exercise such restraint already at the rule-making stage.
20' First, Section 6 of the Export Administration Act in several places
enjoins the President to consider the position of other countries
before taking or extending export controls.
a
(3) the reaction of
export controLs
rn para. (d): "... the president shal1 determine that reasonable
efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of the controls through
negotiations or ot.her alternative means".
Finally in para. (g): r'... the president shall take all feasible sreps
to initiate and conclude negotiations for the purpose of.securing the
cooperation of such foreign governments in conlrol1ing the export to
countries and consignees to which the u.S. export controls apply of
any goods or technology comparable to goods or technology controlled
under this sectiont'.
21. In the second place, these Amendments to the Export Administration
Regulations may not be subject to substanEive judicial review. This
means that u.s. courts may not be able to apply their balancing of
interests approach in a clash of enforcement jurisdictions. It is
therefore appropriate for the executive to apply it at the rule-making
sEage.
22 Finally, the direction in which informed lega1 opinion in the u.S. is
moving on this issue is demonstrated by the new draft Restatement
(3rd) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S.
(l) ManningEon Mi1ls Inc. v Congoleum Corp. 1979-l Trade Cases No.62 .547.
ll
rt does away with Ehe rather artificial distinction between the right
to assert a jurisdiction to prescribe and restraint in exercising it.
rt simply'considers that the exercise of a jurisdiction to prescribe
may be unreasonable; to decide whether this is so or noE drafL
para. 403 (l) enjoins the evaluat,ion of such factors as place of Ehe
activity to be regulated, links of persons falling under the regulation
with other states, consistency with the traditions of the international
system' interests of other states in regulating the activity concerned,
and the existence of justified expectations to be affected by the
regulation.
23, whatever approach is adopted by the u.S. Government in balancing u.s.
interests against the interests of the European community, the
following considerations have been neglecEed.
- The interest of the European Conmunity in regulating the foreign
trade of the nationals of the Member States in the territory to
which the Commurrity Treaties apply is paramount over any foreign
policy purposes that a third country may have.
- The conduct required by the Amendments is to take place largely
in territory to which the E.c. Treaties apply and not in u.S.
territory.
- The nationality and other ties of many persons whose conduct is
. 
purportedry regulated by the Jwre 22 Amendments link them
primarily to E.C. Member States and not to the U.S.
- There are justified expectations on the part of E.c. companies
which are seriously hurt by the U.S. measures.
c
24
9rr!erie-ssger_qes gige_EQ)-e!-lbe_Erperg Administration AcE
rt can hardly be claimed that the u.s. measures satisfy the criteria
Laid down in the Export Administration Act, and therefore it is
doubtful whether the restrictions are properly applied in terms of
u.s. 1aw. criterion I refers to the probability that the controls
will achieve t,he intended foreign policy purposes. Soviet Authorities
have clearly stated their intention to deliver gas Eo western Europe
as scheduled, and there is little reason to doubt their ability to do
so, even without American or European equipment since the existing
soviet pipeline system already has sufficient spare capacity, at least
(l) Cited in Harold G. MAIER, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction aE a Crossroads:
an Intersection beEween Public and Private International Law, 75 American
Journal of International Law 1982,280, at 300-301.
t2-
to cover the requirements of Ehe early phases of the programme of
deliveries. If the pipeline is built with Soviet technology and ghs
gas flows on time, these U.S. export controls are at besE ineffectual,
and may well be self-defeating, as instruments of foreign policy.
25. Criterion 3 requires that t,he reaction of other countries to the
imposition or expansion of such export controls be taken inEo account.
In view of the extra-Eerritorial application, and retroactive effect
of the U.S. measures, the European Community cannot fail to denounce
the measure as unLawful under international 1aw; and in view of their
damaging economic and political consequences, has already protested in
the strongest terms.
26. Criterion 4 requires consideration of the effects of the proposed
cont,rols on the export performance of the United SEaEes. Here again,
confirmation of the U.S. measures despite criterion 4 would involve
complete disregard for damaging effects not only immediately, but also
in the longer Eerm, owing to the grave doubts that are bound to arise
in future about the U.S. as a reliable supplier of equipment under
contract, or as a reliable partner in technology-licensing arrangements.
This danger has already been pointed out to the PresidenE of the
United States by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
D. ggspesgeliel-Ier-4esese- U.S. measures
27. The U.S. measures inasmuch as they refer to exports from countries
outside the U.S. are all the more objectionable, as they affect
contracts that were free from restrictions imposed by the U.S.
Authorities at the time of their conclusion.
The main contractors of the Siberian pipeline, a number of major sub-con-
tractors and suppliers as well as other exporters, will suffer :'
substantial economic and financial losses for which no compensation is
provided. Fof many sub-contractors who for the most part have nothing
to do with American goods or technology for gas transport, the
practical consequences of the Amendments will be particularly severe
and may actually force them out of business. Lay-offs of a considerable
number of workers will result in any case from the Amendments.
I
I
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' The idia that eompensation is due in case private property or existing
contracts are seriously affected by goverrunent action is also familiar
in Ehe u.s. ]egal system. rf u.s. Government takes private properry
by eminent domain it has Eo compensaEe the or^,ner. The supreme court
has indicated many times that if reguratory regislation virtually
deprives a person of the compr.ete use and enjoyment of his property
the Iaw of eminent domain applies (l).
Justice Brandeis has written: "rt is true that the police power
embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or the,
gene5al welfare But when particular individuals are singled out
to bear the cost of advancing the public convenience, that imposition
must bear some reasonable relation to the evils to be eradicated or
the advantages to be secured,, (2). It is self-evident that for
European contractors and sub-contractors within the E.c. the cost
irrposed upon them by the Anendments does not bear a reasonabre).
relation .o the advantage of furthering American exporE policy.
29' This lack of provision for compensaEion or prot,ection is all the more
disconcerting, because the Amendments of June 22 purport to regurate
not merely u.s. external trade (3), but E.c. externaL trade as wel1.
Moreover, these are considerations which obviously have played a roLe
in the imposition of foreign trade embargoes in the past. Firstly, both the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (1981) and the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations (1979) exempted to a large extent foreign incorporated
firms with ties to u.s. firms from otherwise stringent or even
absolure trade prohibitions (4). Secondly, both the trade embargo
connected with the rranian hostage crisis and the embargo on grain
shipments to the u.S.S.R. permitted existing contracts to be honoured.
(l) Most recenrly in Goldblatr v.(te62) 
.
Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594
(2)
(3)
Nashville C. and St. L. Ry v. I,Ialters, 294 tJS 4OS, 42g (1935).
BuEtfield v. Srranahan, 192 us 470,493 (1904) indicares rhar insofar
as it concerns U.S. exEernal trade it may be difficult to assert Fifth
Amendment rights.
This is not to say that the E.c. agrees in principle to the way in
which these Regulations handle the problem of extia-terriroriaiity.
(4)
t4- IJ
IV. CONCLUSION
:
30. The European Community considers that the Amendments to the Export
Administration Regulations of June 22 1982 are unlawful since they
cannot be validly based on any of the generally accepted bases of
jurisdiction in int,ernational law. Moreover, insofar as these
Amendments tend to enlist companies whose main ties are to the E.C.
Member StaEes for purposes of American trade policy vis-E-vis the
U.S.S.R., they constitute an unacceptable interference in the
independent commercial policy of the E.C. Comparable measures by
third states have been rejected by the U.S. in the past.
31. Even from the standpoint of U.S. l-aw, the European Community considers
that the United States has not adopted a proper "balance of interests'l
approaeh. The European Community further considers that the Amendments
are of doubtful validity under the criteria of the Export Administration
Act of 1979.
32 For Ehese reasons, the European Community ca1ls upon the U.S.
Authorities to withdraw these measures.
a
